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Abstract—Distributed key generation is a method for a set
of players to generate a pair of public key and private key
together, such that the public key is output publicly while
the private key is distributed among the players by a secret
sharing method. Secure distributed key generation in ﬁnite
ﬁeld for discrete-log based cryptosystems has been studied for
many year and many protocols have been proposed and widely
used in threshold cryptosystems and distributed cryptographic
computing. In this paper we focus on secure distributed key
generation in bilinear groups and propose such protocol on
vector space access structures. The new proposed distributed
key generation protocol is secure and has a wide application.
We give detailed proof for its security.
Keywords-distributed key generation; vector space access
structure; bilinear groups; discrete logarithm; cloud computing
security;
I. INTRODUCTION
Distributed key generation(DKG for short) [1], [2] is an
essential component of threshold cryptosystem [3], [4], [5]
and distributed cryptographic computing. It is mainly used
to generate a pair of public key and private key for a
cryptosystem by the players together in such a way that
the public key is output in the clear while the private key is
shared by the players via a secret sharing [6] method.
The ﬁrst distributed key generation protocol is introduced
by T.Pedersen in [7], and it is proofed to be insecure in [1].
R.Gennaro et al. specially studied distribute key generation
for discrete-log based cryptosystems in [1], [2] and showed
a method to establish such secure DKG protocol. Their
DKG protocol is for threshold access structure and has been
widely used in many threshold cryptosystems. As threshold
access structure demands every player an identical power
and position, DKG protocol on threshold access structure has
some restrictions in practice consequently. For this problem
F.Zhang et al. studied secure distributed key generation on
non-threshold access structure in detail. They proposed a
DKG protocol based on vector space access structure in
[8] and a DKG protocol based on generalized veriﬁable
secret sharing in [9]. By then, distributed key generation
for generating a pair of keys that are elements of ﬁnite
ﬁeld, either on threshold access structure or on non-threshold
access structure, has been well established.
Recently, pairing-based cryptography has received much
attention from cryptographic researchers and many schemes
have been proposed [10], [11], [12], [13], [14], [15], [16].
In most pairing-based threshold cryptosystems, the pair of
public key and private key are elements from bilinear groups,
thus distributed key generation protocol in bilinear groups
is an essential component of such cryptosystem. J.Baek and
Y.Zheng focused on this topic and proposed such distributed
key generation protocol in [17] as a building block of
their identity-based threshold signature scheme. Their DKG
protocol is for threshold access structure and bilinear group
based DKG protocol on non-threshold access structure has
not been studied yet.
In this paper we focus on distributed key generation
on vector space access structure for generating a pair of
keys that are elements of bilinear groups. We propose such
protocol and specially discuss its security from two aspects:
correctness and secrecy. The new proposed protocol has a
wide application in practice.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section
2 we mainly review the concepts of bilinear pairings, access
structure and secure DKG. Then in Section 3 we show the
building blocks of our DKG protocol. In Section 4 we give
our secure distributed key generation protocol with vector
space access structure in bilinear groups in detail. We also
specially analyze its security from correctness and secrecy.
At last in Section 5 we just conclude this paper.
II. PRELIMINARIES AND DEFINITIONS
In this section, we brieﬂy review the concepts of bilinear
pairings and access structure. Besides we consider two op-
erations on vector space which will be used in the following
sections.
A. Bilinear Pairings
Let G1 and G2 be two groups with the same order q,
where q is a large prime. Here, we assume that G1 is
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an additive cyclic group, and G2 is a multiplicative cyclic
group. A map eˆ: G1 ×G1 −→ G2 is called a bilinear map
if it satisﬁes the following three conditions:
1) Bilinear: For all P,Q ∈ G1 and a, b ∈ Z∗q ,
eˆ(aP, bQ) = eˆ(P,Q)ab.
2) Non-degenerate: There exist P,Q ∈ G1 such that
eˆ(P,Q) = 1.
3) Computable: For all P,Q ∈ G1, there exists an
efﬁcient algorithm to compute eˆ(P,Q).
We say that G1 is a bilinear group if there exists a group G2
and a bilinear map eˆ : G×G1 −→ G2 as above, where eˆ and
the group action in G1 and G2 can be computed efﬁciently.
B. Access Structure
Assume D is the dealer who holds a secret to distribute
among a set of n participants H = {H1, ..., Hn}. An
access structure Γ on H speciﬁes a family of qualiﬁed
subsets that can reconstruct the shared secret. We denote by
Γ0 = {A1, ..., At} the basis of Γ, that is the set of minimal
elements of Γ under inclusion. Here we brieﬂy describe the
notion of the most common threshold access structure and
the more general vector space one which actually involves
the threshold one.
• Threshold access structure: The access structure of
a (t, n) threshold secret sharing scheme consists of all
the subsets with at least t of n participants.
• Vector space access structure: Let the secret space
K = GF (q) be a ﬁnite ﬁeld and E = Kt a vector
space. The access structure Γ is said to be a vector
space access structure if there exists a function
ψ : {D} ∪H → E
such that A ∈ Γ if and only if the vector ψ(D) can be
expressed as a linear combination of the vectors in the
set {ψ(P )|P ∈ A}.
C. Operations on Vector Space
Assume α = (a1, ..., at), ν = (v1, ..., vt), V =
(V1, ..., Vt), where a1, ..., at, v1, ..., vt are elements of a
ﬁnite ﬁeld K and V1, ..., Vt are elements of an additive
group G1. In our construction, we use the operation of inner
product in Kt, and an operation of an element of Kt with
an element in Gt1.
• α • ν = a1v1 + · · ·+ atvt
• α ◦ V = a1V1 + · · ·+ atVt
Obviously the result of the ﬁrst operation is an element
in K and the second belongs to G1.
D. Secure DKG for Discrete-Log Based Cryptosystems
A distributed key generation protocol is implemented
among a set of players H1, H2, ..., Hn to generate the secret
key and public key of the cryptosystem. The secret key is
shared by H1, H2, ..., Hn via an access structure, and the
public key is output in the clear. A DKG protocol mainly
contains two phases:
• Generating the secret key: In this phase each partici-
pant chooses a random value and distributes it through
all the players via a veriﬁable secret sharing scheme as
a dealer. In the end, every player gets his share of the
secret key.
• Extracting the public key: This phase outputs the
corresponding public key in the clear.
Consider a static and strong admissible adversary[18], i.e.
the adversary has determined which players to corrupt before
the protocol being implemented, and can corrupt all but one
player in each authorized subset. The only constraint on this
adversary is that at least one authorized subset must remain
pure i.e. composed of all uncorrupted players. A secure DKG
protocol should satisfy the requirements of correctness and
secrecy:
• Correctness:
1) All qualiﬁed subsets composed by honest players
deﬁne the same unique secret key.
2) All honest players have the same value of public
key about the secret key guaranteed by 1.
3) The secret key is uniformly distributed(and hence
the public key).
• Secrecy:
No information on the secret key can be learned by the
adversary except for what is implied by the public key.
For more details about distributed key generation, please
refer to [1], [2], [8].
III. BUILDING BLOCKS FOR OUR DKG PROTOCOL
A. Secret Sharing in Bilinear Groups on Vector Space
Access Structures
The participants of this system consist a dealer D and a
set of n players H = {H1, ..., Hn}. Suppose Γ is the vector
space access structure with basis Γ0 deﬁned on H . Both the
secret space and the share space are K = G1, where G1 is
an additive group of a prime order q.
To share a random secret S of G1, the dealer D ﬁrstly
publishes a map ψ: {D} ∪ H → Ztq . Then D randomly
chooses a secret vector V = (V1, ..., Vt) from Kt such
that ψ(D) ◦ V = a1V1 + · · · + atVt = S where ψ(D) =
(a1, ..., at) = α. Let ψ(Hj) = (aj1, ..., ajt) = αj , then
the share distributed to Hj by D is Sj = ψ(Hj) ◦ V =
aj1V1 + · · ·+ ajtVt.
When a qualiﬁed subset A = {Hi1 , ..., Hil} of Γ intends
to reconstruct the secret, members of A ﬁrstly compute χ
from χψ(A) = ψ(D), where χ is a vector in Zlq and ψ(A) is
a matrix establishes its row vectors by ψ(Hj1), ..., ψ(Hjl).
Then the secret can be calculated from S = χ ◦ SA with
SA = (Sj1 , ..., Sjl).
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B. Information-Theoretical Secure Veriﬁable Secret Sharing
in Bilinear Groups on Vector Space Access Structures
• Parameters:
Assume G1, G2 are two groups with the same prime
order q and eˆ is the bilinear map as we refer previously
in Section 2. Let P be a random generator of G1
such that the discrete logarithm problem with basis
P in G1 is intractable, and γ be a random element
of G2 where nobody knows the discrete logarithm of
γ. The secret space and the the share space are G1
and G1 × Zq respectively. The access structure Γ is a
vector space access structure with basis Γ0. Assume S
is the secret randomly chosen from G1 to be shared
among n participants and t is the maximum order of
the minimum qualiﬁed subset.
• Algorithm of sharing:
– The dealer D publishes a map ψ: {D} ∪ H →
Ztq . Assume that ψ(D) = (a1, ..., at) = α and
ψ(Hj) = (aj1, ..., ajt) = αj .
– Choose a secret vector V = (V1, ..., Vt) from Gt1
such that ψ(D) ◦ V = a1V1 + · · ·+ atVt = S.
Choose another secret vector β = (b1, ..., bt) from
Ztq and set r = ψ(D) • β = a1b1 + · · ·+ atbt.
– Compute and broadcast Ek = eˆ(Vk, P )γbk for k =
1, ..., t.
– D computes
Sj = ψ(Hj) ◦ V = aj1V1 + · · ·+ ajtVt,
rj = ψ(Hj) • β = aj1b1 + · · ·+ ajtbt
and sends (Sj , rj) secretly to Hj for j = 1, ..., n.
• Algorithm of Veriﬁcation:
When Hj has received his share (Sj , rj) he checks if
eˆ(Sj , P )γ
rj =
t∏
k=1
Ek
ajk (1)
• Algorithm of Reconstruction:
Suggest A = {Hi1 , ..., Hil} is a subset of Γ to
reconstruct the shared secret. Each participant Hj(j =
i1, ..., il) broadcasts his share (Sj , rj) to others in A.
Every one can verify the validity of shares provided by
others through Eq. (1).
After receiving all the valid shares of a qualiﬁed subset,
the participants ﬁrstly compute χ from χψ(A) = ψ(D)
where χ is a vector in Zlq and ψ(A) is a matrix
establishes its row vectors from ψ(Hi1), ..., ψ(Hil).
Then the secret can be calculated from S = χ◦SA with
SA = (Si1 , ..., Sil). Actually as long as they obtain
the shares whose holders are enough to determine
a minimum qualiﬁed subset in A, the secret can be
reconstructed effectively.
IV. OUR SECURE DKG PROTOCOL WITH VECTOR SPACE
ACCESS STRUCTURE ON BILINEAR GROUPS
A. The Protocol
• Parameters:
Assume G1, G2 are two groups with the same order
q and eˆ : G1 × G1 → G2 is a bilinear map. Let
P be a generator of G1 where the discrete logarithm
problem with basis P is intractable in G1, and γ be
a random element of G2 such that no one knows the
discrete logarithm of γ. The participants of the system
are a set H of n players H1, ..., Hn. Before the phase
of generating secret key, the players decide a vector
space access structure Γ on H together, i.e. the map
ψ : {D}∪H → GF (q)t as we deﬁned in Section 2. In
fact, there does not exist a real dealer D in our system
and the players just need determine the vectors ψ(D) =
α = (a1, · · · , at), ψ(Hi) = αi = (ai1, · · · , ait) for
i = 1, ..., n such that α can be expressed as a linear
combination of the vectors in the set {ψ(P )|P ∈ A},
where A denotes the qualiﬁed subset.
• Generating X:
1) – Each Hi chooses a random value Si from G1
and a value ri from Zq . Then choose a vector
Vi = (Vi1, · · · , Vit) from Gt1 and a vector βi =
(bi1, · · · , bit) from Ztq such that Si = α ◦ Vi =
a1Vi1 + · · ·+ atVit and ri = α • βi = a1bi1 +
· · · + atbit. Publish Eik = eˆ(Vik, P )γbik for
k = 1, · · · , t.
Compute Sij = ψ(Hj) ◦ Vi = aj1Vi1 + · · · +
ajtVit and rij = ψ(Hj) • βi = aj1bi1 +
· · · + ajtbit for j = 1, · · · , n. Then Hi sends
(Sij , rij) secretly to Hj .
– When Hj has received his share (Sij , rij) he
checks if
eˆ(Sij , P )γ
rij =
t∏
k=1
Eik
ajk (2)
If Eq.(2) fails, Hj broadcast a complaint a-
gainst Hi.
– Each Hi who received a complaint from Hj
broadcast (Sij , rij) that satisfy Eq.(2).
– Each player marks as disqualiﬁed any player
that either
∗ received complaints of all players in one
qualiﬁed subset or
∗ answered to a complaint with values that do
not satisfy Eq.(2).
2) Each player builds the set of non-disqualiﬁed
players QUAL.
3) Each player Hi computes his shares Xi =∑
j∈QUAL Sji and xi =
∑
j∈QUAL rji. The dis-
tributed secret value X is not explicitly computed
by any party, but it equals to X =
∑
i∈QUAL Si.
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• Extracting Y = eˆ(X,P ):
1) Each Hi in QUAL broadcasts Aik = eˆ(Vik, P )
for k = 1, · · · , t.
2) For j = 1, ..., n, everyHj veriﬁes the value broad-
cast by players in QUAL through the following
equation
eˆ(Sij , P ) =
t∏
k=1
Aik
ajk . (3)
If the check succeeds, set Y˜i =
∏t
k=1Aik
ak . Else
Hj broadcasts a complaint against Hi and publish
Sij , rij .
3) For players Hi who receive at least one valid
complaint, the other players run the reconstruction
phase to compute Si and set Y˜i = eˆ(Si, P ).
4) Compute Y =
∏
i∈QUAL Y˜i.
B. Security
We proof the security of our protocol from the two
aspects: correctness and secrecy as we mentioned in Section
2.
• Correctness:
Theorem 1 All qualiﬁed subsets composed by honest
players deﬁne the same unique secret key X .
Proof: From the deﬁnition of the adversary, we
know that there is at lest one qualiﬁed subset composed
by honest players. Suppose A = {H1, H2, ..., Hl} is
a qualiﬁed subset where H1, H2, ..., Hl are all uncor-
rupted players. The share of X possessed by Hi is
Xi =
∑
j∈QUAL Sji =
∑
j∈QUAL αi ◦ Vj . The secret
determined by A can be reconstructed as following:
– Players in A calculate out μ = (u1, u2, ..., ul) such
that u1α1 + u2α2 + · · ·+ ulαl = α.
– The secret X is determined by X = μ ◦
(X1, ..., Xl) = u1X1 + · · ·+ ulXl.
As Xi =
∑
j∈QUAL Sji =
∑
j∈QUAL αi ◦Vj , we have
X = u1X1 + · · ·+ ulXl
= u1
∑
j∈QUAL
Sj1 + · · ·+ ul
∑
j∈QUAL
Sjl
= u1
∑
j∈QUAL
α1 ◦ Vj + · · ·+ ul
∑
j∈QUAL
αl ◦ Vj
=
∑
j∈QUAL
u1α1 ◦ Vj + · · ·+
∑
j∈QUAL
ulαl ◦ Vj
=
∑
j∈QUAL
(u1α1 + · · ·+ ulαl) ◦ Vj
=
∑
j∈QUAL
α ◦ Vj
=
∑
j∈QUAL
Sj .
Obliviously, the secret determined by any qualiﬁed
subset with all players being honest equals to the X
generated by our protocol. That means all qualiﬁed
subsets composed by honest players determine the same
unique secret key X .
Theorem 2 All honest players have the same value
of the public key Y = eˆ(X,P ) with X guaranteed by
Theorem 1.
Proof: From the algorithm of extracting the public
key we know that Y =
∏
i∈QUAL Y˜i. In the proto-
col the values Y˜i are calculated either through Y˜i =∏t
k=1Aik
ak if the public values Aik has been veriﬁed
to be correct through Eq.(3), or else by Y˜i = eˆ(Si, P )
where Si is reconstructed by the players. As
Y˜i =
t∏
k=1
Aik
ak =
t∏
k=1
eˆ(Vik, P )
ak
=
t∏
k=1
eˆ(aikVik, P ) = eˆ(
t∑
k=0
aikVik, P )
= eˆ(Si, P ),
then
Y =
∏
i∈QUAL
Y˜i =
∏
i∈QUAL
eˆ(Si, P )
= eˆ(
∑
i∈QUAL
Si, P ) = eˆ(X,P ).
This means the players who act correctly get the same
value of public key.
Theorem 3 The secret key X is uniformly distributed in
G1, and hence the public key Y is uniformly distributed
in G2.
Proof: The secret key X is deﬁned as X =∑
i∈QUAL Si, thus as long as there is one value Si in
this sum is chosen at random from G1, X is uniformly
distributed in G1. In the protocol we can see that the
set QUAL is determined by all the honest players and
some of the corrupted players who executed correctly
in Step 1-2 of Generating X in the protocol. Thus
there must be at least one Si with i ∈ QUAL is
uniformly distributed in G1, which guarantees that
X =
∑
i∈QUAL Si is uniformly distributed in G1 and
consequently Y = eˆ(X,P ) is uniformly distributed in
G2.
• Secrecy:
We employ the same concept of simulatability to state
the secrecy of our DKG protocol as in [1]: for every
static and strong admissible adversary A, there exists a
simulator SIM such that on input an element Y in G2
produces an output distribution which is polynomially
indistinguishable from A’s view of a run of the DKG
protocol that ends with Y as its public key output.
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We ﬁrstly provide a simulator SIM for our DKG
protocol, and then we will show that the view of the
adversary A that interacts with SIM on input Y is the
same as the view of A that interacts with the honest
players in a regular run of the protocol that outputs the
given Y as the public key.
– Algorithm of simulator SIM Denote by B =
{Hi1 , ..., Him} the set of players controlled by the
adversary, and by G the set of honest players run
by the simulator SIM . Note that no subset of B is
a qualiﬁed subset and there is at least one subset in
G is a qualiﬁed subset. The algorithm of simulator
is implemented as follow.
∗ Input public key Y .
∗ Perform Step 1-2 of Generating X in protocol
DKG on behalf of the uncorrupted players in
G. At the end of Step 2 the following holds:
1) The set QUAL is well deﬁned and G ∈
QUAL. For i ∈ G all the Vi, βi are chosen
at random.
2) The view of the adversary consists of the
secret vectors Vi, βi for i ∈ B, the shares
(Sij , rij) for i ∈ QUAL and j ∈ B, and all
the public values Eik for i ∈ QUAL, k =
1, ..., t.
3) SIM knows all the vectors Vi, βi for i ∈ G
and thus possesses the shares (Sij , rij) for
i ∈ G, j = 1, ..., n. For i ∈ QUAL⋂B,
as there is at least one qualiﬁed subset in G
that run by SIM , the shares (Sij , rij) for
j = 1, ..., n can be reconstructed by SIM .
In a word, SIM knows all the (Sij , rij) for
i ∈ QUAL, j = 1, ..., n.
∗ Perform the following computations:
· Compute Aik = eˆ(Vik, P ) for i ∈ QUAL \
{h}, k = 1, ..., t, where h can be any random
element in QUAL
⋂G.
· Set Y˜h
∗
= Y
∏
i∈QUAL\{h} Y˜i
−1
· Compute the vector A∗hk = eˆ(V ∗hk, P ) for k =
1, ..., t from the following equation:
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩
eˆ(α ◦ V ∗h , P ) = eˆ(S∗h, P ) = Y˜h
∗
eˆ(αi1 ◦ V ∗h , P ) = eˆ(Shi1 , P )
...
eˆ(αim ◦ V ∗h , P ) = eˆ(Shim , P )
(4)
i.e.⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
eˆ(V ∗h1, P )
a1 · · · eˆ(V ∗ht, P )at
= Ah1
a1 · · ·Ahtat = Y˜h
∗
eˆ(V ∗h1, P )
ai11 · · · eˆ(V ∗ht, P )ai1t
= Ah1
ai11 · · ·Ahtai1t = eˆ(Shi1 , P )
...
eˆ(V ∗h1, P )
aim1 · · · eˆ(Vht, P )aimt
= Ah1
aim1 · · ·Ahtaimt = eˆ(Shim , P )
(5)
∗ Broadcast Aik for i ∈ G \ {h} and A∗hk for
k = 1, ..., t.
∗ Perform Step 2-4 of Extracting Y in protocol
DKG on behalf of the honest players.
– Analysis of simulatablility The probability distri-
bution of A’s view from the uncorrupted parties in
a regular run of our DKG protocol is as following:
∗ The shares Sij and rij for i ∈ G, j ∈ B are
uniformly distributed in G1 and Zq respectively.
∗ Public values Eik, Aik for i ∈ G, k = 1, ..., t
satisfy the veriﬁcation equations (2) and (3)
respectively for all j ∈ B.
In the algorithm of simulator SIM with the
uncorrupted players implements Step 1-2 of Gen-
erating X as in our real DKG protocol. Note
that at the end of Step 2 the shares (Sij , rij) for
i ∈ G, j ∈ B have been determined and the veri-
ﬁcations for public values Eik, i ∈ G, k = 1, ..., t
have ﬁnished. Thus the distribution of Sij , rij is
polynomially indistinguishable from our real DKG
protocol and the public values Eik satisfy Eq. (2).
Then consider the public values A∗ik, i ∈ G, k =
1, ..., t. For i ∈ G \ {h}, k = 1, ..., t, as A∗ik equal
to the corresponding Aik, they can pass through
the veriﬁcation equation (3). For i = h, note that
A∗hk is calculated from the set of equations (4),
and thus satisfy every equation in (4) and (5).
Obviously in (5) every equations except the ﬁrst
one is actually a veriﬁcation equation from Eq.(3)
where j = i1, ..., im ∈ B, that means those A∗hks
satisfy the veriﬁcation equation (3). In a word, the
public values A∗ik, i ∈ G, k = 1, ..., t satisfy Eq.(3).
Now we can conclude that simulator SIM that on
input an element Y in G2 produces an output dis-
tribution which is polynomially indistinguishable
from A’s view of a run of the DKG protocol that
ends with Y as its public key output, i.e. our DKG
protocol satisfy the requirement of secrecy.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper we proposed a secure DKG protocol on
vector space access structures. The new proposed protocol
is run by a set of players on vector space access structures
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to generator a pair of public key and secret key that are ele-
ments of bilinear groups. We specially discussed it security
from two aspects: correctness and secrecy in our paper. Our
work has a wide application for generating distributed keys
in situation that the users do not possess exactly the same
power and position.
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